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Abstract
In this paper we design and test a competitive forecasting mechanism based on the Colonel
Blotto game. In the game, forecasters allocate a fixed number of resources to different
‘battlefields’. Each field is realized with a probability that is determined by a stochastic
process. Subjects learn about the underlying process during the course of the experiment
and thereby form beliefs about the probability that a field is selected. Once a field is
selected, the subject competes for a payoff that is associated with the number of resources
allocated to that field. We implement two different payment rules, a lottery and an auc-
tion, and find that the lottery outperforms the auction. This relative underperformance
of the auction can be attributed to the strategic uncertainty being too high in the auction
and the strong incentives to misalign allocations.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a forecasting mechanism based on the Colonel Blotto game. The
aim of our mechanism is to elicit forecasts of uncertain events. While belief elicitation and
forecasting has been the subject of a wide range of studies to date our approach allows a fore-
caster to generate forecasts not only about the expected realization but also the distribution
around it. We achieve this by setting up a strategic environment in which forecasters are
competing for a prize.
Similar to the standard Blotto game, individuals divide resources across a set of bins,
or battlefields, each of which has a different realization probability. In the game only one
bin is selected and payoffs are determined based on the resources allocated to this bin, while
resources allocated to other bins are lost. We show theoretically that, in a lottery payment
mechanism, it is an equilibrium strategy for the players to reveal the true realization prob-
abilities by their allocations in the game. However, when allocating payments through an
auction, such an equilibrium does not generally exist.
Further, we design an experiment to test the forecasting performance of our mechanism
and we show that distributions forecasted under the lottery payment outperform those from
the auction setting. We next show that individuals in the auction change their allocations
and coordinate their strategies to a larger extent than in the lottery. Taken together with
the lower performance in forecasting, this shows that the auction mechanism results in worse
forecasts since individuals allocate most of their resources to a few bins. An essential feature
of our experiment is that the forecasting task is abstract and subjects have no prior exposure
or knowledge that allows them to excel at the task in the first round. As a consequence we
observe how subjects familiarize themselves with the environment over time and update their
beliefs about the distribution of termination times.
Additionally, we elicit individual beliefs of the participants about the underlying distri-
bution. Beliefs do not differ systematically between the auction and the lottery which shows
that the beliefs held by subjects do not depend on the payment rule but that they learn
about the underlying process independently of the strategies they play in the game. Thus,
differences in behavior across the payment rules appear to be driven by strategic rather than
environmental concerns.
Taken together, we show that it is sufficient with two competing forecasters to generate
good forecasts. In many instances where relevant information is held by a select group of
individuals our mechanism can help a decision maker to elicit forecasts of an uncertain event.
The mechanism presented here relates to several streams of literature. In particular, pre-
diction markets have been developed to forecast uncertain events and have been successfully
implemented to predict the outcome of political elections (Forsythe et al., 1992) and organiza-
tional processes (Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2013) among many other applications. Yet, operating
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a prediction market does not come without problems. It has been suggested that they are
susceptible to manipulation (Veiga & Vorsatz, 2006) and in some countries it is difficult to
operate them from a legal perspective (Arrow et al., 2008). Further, prediction markets re-
quire substantial trading to create liquid and informative market prices. Our paper presents
an incentive compatible forecasting mechanism by which we are able to generate informative
forecasts with fewer individuals and thus presents a viable alternative to prediction markets
in environments where such markets cannot easily be operated.
An alternative to our approach that does not require a large set of traders is to elicit beliefs
using scoring rules, so called ‘truth serums’ (see for instance Prelec, 2004; Trautmann & van de
Kuilen, 2015). Scoring rules provide an incentive compatible mechanism for belief elicitation
at an individual level and has several advantages over market based mechanisms since they are
non-competitive and forecasts thereby do not suffer from strategic elements that can distort
forecasts. Several studies have shown that mechanisms based on, or inspired by, scoring rules
are able to generate good forecasts (see for instance Goel et al., 2010). However, one common
problem is to successfully elicit distributions (Peeters & Wolk, 2015). An exception is Harrison
et al. (2013) where they develop a mechanism to elicit belief distributions using an individual
scoring rule. The mechanism presented in this paper explicitly deviates from the scoring
rule approach by its competitive design. We explicitly introduce competition to motivate
participants to exert more cognitive effort in the forecasting task. It is commonly known
that games, or other competitive environments, carry a non-pecuniary value to participants,
making our mechanism attractive to field adoption.
A third related stream of literature, that also incorporates the competitive element present
in this paper, is the literature on parimutuel wagering, often in the context of betting
(Figlewski, 1979; Thaler & Ziemba, 1988). For instance, Plott et al. (2003) design an ex-
periment to test information aggregation using this type of mechanism. In the experiment,
the authors implement a continuous market where bettors can place bets at any time prior
to closing. The authors show that the mechanism induces information aggregation. Further,
Koessler et al. (2012) study how beliefs interact with market odds and show that when elic-
iting beliefs, market odds are better aligned with the objective probabilities. Gillen et al.
(2013) implement a parimutuel-like information aggregation mechanism at Intel and shows
that this mechanism has predictive power against the distribution of realized outcomes. A
common feature of betting markets is that they allow sequential betting. In our study all
bets are placed simultaneously and players are symmetric to the extent that they posses an
equal amount of resources and all have to be invested in the game in each period. The ex-
pected payment does not depend on endogenous participation in the game. Therefore, the
entry decision does not depend on how many players already have entered. Additionally, we
investigate two different payment rules one of which differs from the betting literature.
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The paper is structured as follows. In the next sections we show the equilibrium strategy
of the game under different payment rules. In Section 3 we describe the experimental setup
and implementation of the game and the hypotheses of our study. In Section 4 we evaluate
the performance and functioning of the mechanism using experimental data. Subsequently,
in Section 5, we conclude.
2 Colonel Blotto meets Tullock
Let there be m events E1, . . . , Em with consecutive realization probabilities p1, . . . , pm with
pj > 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,m and
∑m
j=1 pj = 1 and we assume that these probabilities are
known to the n players. Each of the n players has a unit amount of resources that are to be
distributed over the m events. Let the distribution of player i be denoted by σi = (σi1, . . . , σ
i
m)
with σij ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,m and
∑m
j=1 σ
i
j = 1. If event E` realizes (which is the case with
probability p`), then player k receives a share of
(σk` )
ρ∑n
i=1(σ
i
`)
ρ of the total reward, where ρ > 1 is
the Tullock contest success parameter.1
For ρ = 1 the share of the reward a player receives equals the probability to win in a lottery
where the mass that the players put on the realized event reflects the number of tickets with
which these players participate in this lottery. For ρ =∞, the reward is evenly shared among
the players that put most resources on the realized event, and the mechanism works like an
auction.
Theorem 1. If ρ < nn−2 , then, in the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, all players
distribute their resources in proportion to the realization probabilities (i.e. σij = pj for all
j = 1, . . . ,m and for all i = 1, . . . , n).
Proof. In a Nash equilibrium σ¯, player i’s resource distribution σ¯i solves
max(σij)j=1,...,m
∑m
j=1 pj
(σij)
ρ
(σij)
ρ+
∑
ι 6=i(σ¯
ι
j)
ρ
subject to σij ≥ 0 (j = 1, . . . ,m) and
∑m
j=1 σ
i
j = 1
Ignoring the inequalities, the first order conditions are given by
pj
ρ (σ¯ij)
ρ−1 ∑
ι6=i(σ¯
ι
j)
ρ
[ (σ¯ij)
ρ +
∑
ι6=i(σ¯
ι
j)
ρ ]2
= λi (j = 1, . . . ,m).
By symmetry we get, for all i,2
pj
ρ (n− 1)
n2 σ¯ij
= λi (j = 1, . . . ,m) or σ¯ij =
1
λi
ρ
n− 1
n2
pj (j = 1, . . . ,m).
1It is convenient to assume that all players receive 1
n
if none of the players has put any mass on the realized
event.
2Here we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria. Actually, for ρ = 1 and for n = 2 symmetry can be
derived.
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As 1
λi
ρ n−1
n2
is constant with respect to j, we obtain, for all i = 1, . . . , n,
σ¯ij = pj (j = 1, . . . ,m).
It is easily shown that ρ < nn−2 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the second order
conditions to be satisfied at this solution to the first order conditions.3 
One nice feature implied by the theorem is that, in case the game designer does not know
the realization probabilities, but knows that they are common knowledge to the players,
equilibrium behavior would perfectly reveal these probabilities to her. For this property to
be satisfied the contest parameter should not be too large relative to the number of players.
For the lottery payment (ρ = 1) we find that this feature holds for any number of players.
When there are only two players, it is obtained for all finite values of the contest parameter.
On the other hand, for the auction rule (ρ = ∞) the profile in the theorem is definitely
not an equilibrium. For the auction payment rule, Roberson (2006) characterizes the unique
equilibrium payoffs for the setting with two players, n battlefields, and where a player’s
payoff is the proportion of wins on the individual battlefields (where the winner within each
battlefield is decided as in an auction). In payoff terms this situation is equivalent to our
situation if our bins were all to have equal chance of being decisive. These chances not
being equal in our setting further complicates a possible characterization of an equilibrium
as equilibrium properties will depend highly on the realization probabilities. For example,
think of a situation with two players and two bins. If the one bin has a realization probability
between 1/3 and 2/3 there is an equilibrium (but it is certainly not unique) where the players
allocate all their resources to different bins, while there is an equilibrium where both players
put all their resources on the high probability bin in all other cases. In general, instances
where a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist are easily constructed for the situation where
the number of events exceeds the number of players.
3 Experimental design
In this section we subsequently define the decision framework, the experimental design and
procedures, and the hypotheses – some of which are theory based, others are following common
sense.
3For the two player situation with lottery payment the strategy profile in the theorem has already been
shown to be the unique Nash equilibrium in Friedman (1958). As Friedman (1958) considers unequal amounts
of available resources for the two players, it is pretty straight-forward to see that the n-player extension of
this equilibrium strategy profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game situation with n players. The
uniqueness claim in the theorem is, however, not easily obtained from Friedman (1958). The proof presented
here follows Robson (2005).
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3.1 Setting
Within a group of n individuals (with n taking the values 2, 3, and 4 in our experiment),
each individual is asked to allocate 100 resources over eleven bins as they are illustrated in
Figure 1. These eleven bins represent the possible events (labels above the bins) of which
precisely one will realize. A chance mechanism (to be explained in detail later) determines the
bin that is decisive for the individuals’ payoffs. That is, only the resources that the individuals
allocated to this particular bin is relevant for how the total group reward of 100n points is
shared among the individuals.
1 6 10 10 9 8 7 6 5 5 33
1–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 61–70 71–80 81–90 91–100 101+
Figure 1: The eleven future events.
The chance mechanism that we implemented is based on a random process that starts at
a value of zero at time t = 0 where at each unit of time the value is incremented with a real
number drawn randomly according to a normal distribution with mean zero and a fixed but
unknown variance. The process terminates either when the value crosses the lower boundary
at −2.5, crosses the upper boundary at +2.5, or has reached time t = 100 without having
reached one of these boundaries. Figure 2 shows one time series generated by this process
that led to a termination at the lower bound at time t = 63. The termination time uniquely
determines the bin that is decisive for the payoffs. The labels above the first ten bins in
Figure 1 represent ranges of termination times; the eleventh bin represents the event that it
did not terminate before t = 100.
Value
Time
0 20 40 60 80 100
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
Figure 2: An example of a time series.
For the process that we used in the experiment, Figure 3 presents the true distribution
over termination times, conditional on termination before t = 100. Moreover, the probability
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of the process not terminating before t = 100 equals one-thirds. The resources allocated in
the bins of Figure 1 display the probability (rounded to the nearest integer) that the process
will terminate at the respective bin.
0.020
0.016
0.012
0.008
0.004
0.000
0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 3: Distribution over termination times conditional on termination before t = 100.
We implemented two different rules on how the reward is shared in our experiment: a
lottery rule and an auction rule. According to the former, the shares of the reward that the
individuals receive are proportional to the amount of resources allocated to the decisive bin.
In the latter, the reward is evenly distributed among the individuals that allocated the most
resources to the decisive bin.4
3.2 Design
Individuals repeatedly interact, within the same group, over the course of twenty rounds.
Prior to the first round, participants were shown an animation of a randomly generated time
series. After having seen this animation, they were asked to allocate their resources over the
eleven bins. Next, they were shown the animation of the time series that was generated to
select the decisive bin for the first round. Prior to the second round, participants received all
payoff relevant information from the first round, including the amount of resources their group
members allocated to the decisive bin. This procedure continued until the last (twentieth)
round.
Throughout the twenty periods participants gradually learn more about the chance mech-
anism determining the decisive bin. And, all participants saw the same twenty-one time
series in the same order.5 In the last round, before showing the final animation, we elicited
4In either case, all individuals receive an equal share of the reward when the total number of resources
allocated to the decisive bin equals zero.
5In order to gain an impression of how easy it is for experimental subjects to learn about the true dis-
tribution, Figure 13 in the supplementary material displays the average Hellinger distance between the true
distribution and simulated distributions on basis of a given number of realizations, and the 95% confidence
interval around it. The figure reveals that the marginal reduction in the Hellinger distance is decreasing in
the number of realizations and that up to about fifty realizations the reduction is substantial. Moreover, the
figure shows the Hellinger distance between the true distribution and the empirical distribution on basis of
the realizations throughout the experiment. The particular sequence of realizations (which was not subject to
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the participants’ beliefs about the true probability distribution by which bins realize.6 Final
payment in the experiment was based on the points accumulated over all rounds.
Participants operated in one of the six possible treatments that varied in group size and
payment rule. Table 1 summarizes these six treatments. The number of groups that were
formed for each treatment was such that in total 36 participants operated in each treatment.
group size
mechanism 2 3 4
lottery 18 (36) 12 (36) 9 (36)
auction 18 (36) 12 (36) 9 (36)
Table 1: Number of groups (individuals) per treatment.
3.3 Procedures
The experiments were conducted in the experimental laboratory at Maastricht University
in October 2014. We recruited undergraduate students from various disciplines via ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). All interactions took place anonymously via computer clients that where
connected to a central server. The experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). The instructions, all screenshots, and all time series are provided in the supplementary
material for one of the treatments. In total, 216 students participated in the experiment: 36
for each treatment. A typical session lasted about an hour and the average payoff was 18.26
Euros (including a 3 Euro show-up fee).
At the end of the experiment, the participants participated in a short cognition task in
which we measured their perceptual reasoning ability and we elicited their risk attitude and
level of Machiavellianism. For the cognition task, we used the symbol-digit correspondence
test from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), in which subjects had 90 seconds to
find as many correspondences between symbols and numbers as they could, using the correct
number for each symbol. Speed and accuracy under time pressure determine an individuals
ability (cf. Dohmen et al., 2010). Risk attitude was elicited by the direct approach as suggested
in Dohmen et al. (2011). The Machiavellianism score was elicited using the Mach-IV test
(Christie & Geis, 1970). Moreover, we elicited a few personal characteristics, including gender
and age.
experimental manipulation) allows a better than average learning. The fact that the time series were shown as
animation ensured that experimental subjects did not see the final realization only but all gradual innovations
leading to a termination time – this facilitating an even better learning process.
6We incentivized them in such a way that they received one point for each probability point well assigned.
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3.4 Hypotheses
Our main hypothesis is formulated on basis of the extent to which the distribution of re-
sources aggregated on group level reflect the true realization probabilities. We call this the
forecasting performance. According to Theorem 1, which is formulated while assuming com-
mon knowledge of these probabilities, forecasting performance is independent of the group
size for the lottery payment rule. For the auction format we are not able to characterize the
equilibria.7 Though, as it is totally in alignment with the preferences that aggregated re-
sources are allocated monotonically increasing in realization probability, and despite knowing
that there does not exist an equilibrium that shares the elegant property of the equilibrium
in the lottery, we take equal performance across treatments as working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Forecasting performance is independent of the payment rule and group size.
Unlike in the lottery payment, in the auction payment resources allocated to bins to which
a rival player allocated more can be considered as waste. After all, even if the respective
bin is selected these resources do not yield any payoff in the auction, while they always yield
something in the lottery, no matter how small the own amount allocated or how large the
amount allocated by the other players. Therefore, we expect more changes in allocations over
time in the auction than in the lottery on the individual level. Theorem 1 provides no reason
to expect any impact of group size on changes in the lottery. One prominent reason to expect
an impact of group size on changes in the auction format is that changes may be positively
related to the level of strategic uncertainty – the level of strategic uncertainty being larger
for larger group sizes.8 This all yields the following working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Individual allocations change more in the auction than in the lottery. In the
lottery, there is no impact of group size on the number of changes. In the auction, changes
are, if anything, increasing in group size.
Based on roughly the same arguments leading to previous hypothesis, we can formulate the
next hypothesis concerning the disagreement across individual allocations within groups:
Hypothesis 3. Within groups, there is more disagreement in individual allocations in the
auction than in the lottery. In the lottery, there is no impact of group size on the disagreement
in allocations within groups. In the auction, if anything, there will be more disagreement for
larger group sizes.
7Numerically solving for an equilibrium of the discretized game as implemented in the experiment is com-
putationally hard given the high number of actions that players have at their disposal: there are (k+m−1)!
(m−1)!k!
possible ways to allocate k resources over m bins, which amounts to almost 47 trillion actions per player in
our experiment.
8To explain, when n = 2, losing on a particular bin implies a potential high probability of gaining on
another bin. When n = 4, this implication is less straightforward. Stated differently, with more opponents
there are more individuals to learn about, and to respond to.
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In our experiment, all individuals experience the same realizations of the time series in the
same order in all treatments. From that perspective there is no reason to expect that indi-
viduals will develop different beliefs in different treatments. And, even in case differences in
the level of strategic uncertainty may obstruct belief formation process, there is no reason to
expect individuals within the same group to develop different beliefs. This gives rise to our
final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. The level of disagreement in beliefs within groups is independent of the pay-
ment rule and group size.
4 Results
For both the treatments with lottery and auction payment, we collected the sequence of twenty
allocation decisions for eighteen, twelve and nine different groups consisting of respectively
two, three and four members. For all statistical tests we use group averages as unit of
observation. Although for aesthetical reasons the figures restrict focus to the first ten bins,
all statistics are based on all eleven bins. Table 2 provides summary statistics on our pool of
participants.
lottery auction
all n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4
gender (%, male = 1) 47.7% 36.1% 52.8% 41.7% 61.1% 63.9% 30.6%
age (years) 21.1 21.4 21.4 20.2 21.2 22.0 20.4
(2.7) (2.2) (2.3) (4.0) (2.1) (2.9) (2.0)
risk attitude (0–10) 6.3 6.2 6.4 6.2 6.6 6.3 6.2
(1.9) (1.8) (1.7) (2.1) (1.9) (1.9) (2.0)
cognitive ability (number) 42.6 42.5 41.9 43.2 41.7 43.4 43.0
(7.1) (6.9) (5.8) (5.4) (7.2) (6.8) (9.9)
Machiavellianism (20–100) 58.2 58.7 59.8 57.0 57.2 57.7 59.0
(7.2) (6.5) (7.4) (7.4) (6.9) (7.3) (7.6)
Table 2: Summary statistics (mean values and standard deviation in parentheses) of the participants
in the experiment.
4.1 Forecasting performance
Figure 4 presents the average fraction of resources allocated to the different bins in the first
round (dashed) and last round (solid) for the treatments where n = 3, taking into account the
first ten bins only. The left graph shows these for the lottery; the right one for the auction.
The gray-shaded area presents the true distribution (conditional on the first ten bins). From
the graph it is visible that over rounds the resource allocations moved in the direction of the
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true distribution.9
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Figure 4: Forecasted distributions (conditioned on first ten bins).
In order to formally assess the impact of payment rule and group size on the performance
of the group allocations as forecasts it is important to adopt a good measure. Like in Peeters
and Wolk (2015), we use the Hellinger distance (Hellinger, 1909) between the group allocation
(σ˜) and the true distribution (p):
H(σ˜, p) = 1√
2
√∑m
j=1(
√
σ˜j −√pj)2.
This measure quantifies the similarity between two probability distributions and takes the
maximal value of one in case the supports of the group allocation and the true distribution
are disjoint and the minimal value of zero when the two distributions are identical.10
Figure 5 shows the performance of the two mechanisms for the various group sizes. In all
treatments we see a steep decline in the first three rounds, identifying that the way in which
resources are allocated over bins on group-level become more in line with the true probability
distribution. From the fourth round onwards, we see a further declining trend in the lottery
while in the auction there is no further structural decline for any group size. All differences
across treatments are summarized by the following result.
Result 1. The lottery outperforms the auction for all group sizes. For the lottery, perfor-
mance significantly increases from n = 2 to n = 3 and decreases (not significantly though)
from n = 3 to n = 4. For the auction, there is no impact of group size on performance.
9A similar movement is found in the graphs for the treatments with n = 2 and n = 4; see Figure 11 in the
supplementary material.
10An important advantage of the Hellinger distance over often used alternatives (such as the Kullbeck-
Leibler divergence) is that it does not require absolute continuity. Another desirable property of the Hellinger
distance, that we do not exploit here, is that it satisfies the triangular inequality. One notable shortcoming
of the Hellinger distance, which is shared with all existing alternative measures, is that it does not take into
account the linear order on the domain.
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Figure 5: Average Hellinger distance between group allocation and the true distribution over time for
the different treatments. Left: lottery; Right: auction. Solid: n = 2; Dashed: n = 3; Dotted: n = 4.
Support. We test for treatment differences using two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests taking
for each group the average Hellinger distance between the group allocation and true distri-
bution over all rounds as unit of observation. The p-values of the tests comparing the lottery
and the auction are .481, .010 and .000 for n = 2, n = 3 and n = 4, respectively. For the
lottery, the p-value of the test comparing n = 2 with n = 3 equals .001, the one comparing
n = 3 with n = 4 equals .219, and the one comparing n = 2 with n = 4 equals .020. For the
auction, the p-values of the respective comparisons equals .917, .219, and .194. At the 95%
confidence level, the conclusions do not change when basing the analysis on observations in
the last ten rounds; the only thing worth noticing is that the p-value when comparing lottery
and auction for n = 2 drops to .055. 
So, compared to the auction, the lottery is the preferred mechanism. In addition, as can be
seen in the graph, there is less volatility in performance in the lottery – making the lottery a
more robust mechanism.11 One explanation for the observed volatility in the auction is that
in addition to the environmental uncertainty (about realization probabilities) players face a
high level of strategic uncertainty that is caused by the competitiveness of the mechanism
providing incentives to misalign allocations. This we further explore in the subsections to
follow. Furthermore, while within the lottery increasing the number of participants initially
increases performance, beyond a certain number of participants we find no additional benefit
of adding further participants. In our experiment this threshold was found at three players.
11Also the variance in forecasting performance across groups is smaller in the lottery than in the auction
– this effect being significant for group sizes of three and four (see Section 6 of the supplementary material).
This shows the lottery being more robust as a forecasting mechanism compared to the auction.
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4.2 Changes in decisions
In order to quantify the level of change in an individual’s allocation of resources from one
round (σit−1) to the other (σit), we use the Hellinger-distance between these two allocations
(H(σit, σ
i
t−1)). Figure 6 shows the intensity of changes over rounds for the two mechanisms
and the various group sizes. In all treatments we see a steep decline in the first three to
four rounds. From there onwards, we see a further declining trend in the lottery while in the
auction there is no further structural decline for any group size. So, while in the auction they
tend to redistribute a fixed fraction of the total resources available from round to round, in
the lottery they redistribute less resources over rounds.
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Figure 6: Changes in individual allocation of resources. Left: lottery; Right: auction. Solid: n = 2;
Dashed: n = 3; Dotted: n = 4.
Result 2. Individuals change allocations more in the auction for groups of size three and
four; there is no significant difference between lottery and auction for groups of size two. For
the lottery, there is no significant impact of group size on allocation changes on individual
level. For the auction, there are more changes in n = 3 and n = 4 compared to n = 2 and no
significant difference between n = 3 and n = 4.
Support. We test for treatment differences using two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests taking
for each group the average Hellinger distance between the individual allocation in round k
with that in k− 1 over all rounds as unit of observation. The p-values of the tests comparing
the lottery and the auction are .542, .005 and .006 for n = 2, n = 3 and n = 4, respectively.
For the lottery, the p-value of the test comparing n = 2 with n = 3 equals .491, the one
comparing n = 3 with n = 4 equals .345, and the one comparing n = 2 with n = 4 equals
.561. For the auction, the p-values of the respective comparisons equals .012, .219, and .001.
At the 95% confidence level, the conclusions do not change when basing the analysis on
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observations in the last ten rounds. 
A significant difference in individual changes between two treatments may not imply that
also changes in allocations on group level will be different. For example, two individuals may
make precisely the opposite marginal change – this implying that two individuals change, while
nothing changes on group level. Figure 7 shows the average Hellinger distance between the
group allocations in two consecutive rounds (H(σ˜t, σ˜t−1)). Not only do the graphs look quite
similar to those for individual changes, also the same conclusions with respect to treatment
differences can be drawn (Result 2).12
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Figure 7: Changes in individual allocation of resources. Left: lottery; Right: auction. Solid: n = 2;
Dashed: n = 3; Dotted: n = 4.
Based on these findings we may conclude that the volatility in the performance of the
auction (relative to the lottery) is caused by individuals changing their allocations a lot. Yet,
it is not to be concluded that it drives the significant difference in the level of performance
across mechanisms.
4.3 Within group agreement
One explanation for there being more changes in the auction compared to the lottery is that
in the auction players have an incentives to concentrate their resources on a partition of the
bins that is ignored by the other players. This implies that the individual allocations within
a group are disagree more in the auction compared to the lottery. We suggest the following
index to measure the level of disagreement within groups.
DA((σi)ni=1) =
1
n
∑n
i=1H(σ˜, σ
i).
12The p-values of the nine tests in the evidence are respectively .563, .010, .004, .185, .651, .433, .072, .422
and .059. Moreover, the two p-values that are just above .05 drop to below .05 (.048 and .031 respectively)
when restricting attention to the decisions in the last half of the experiment.
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This agreement index entails the average Hellinger distance between the individuals’ alloca-
tions and their group allocation and satisfies several desirable axioms including continuity,
anonymity, normalization and replication invariance (which allows a fair comparison of the
index when applied to groups with different numbers of participants).13
Figure 8 displays the development of the disagreement in allocations within groups over
rounds for the six treatments. Like in earlier figures the left-hand panel shows these for the
lottery and the right one for the auction; the solid, dashed and dotted lines refer to averages for
groups of size two, three and four, respectively. While for the lottery we see again an inclining
trend in the first few round, we do not see this pattern for the auction. Moreover, after an
initial phase, the disagreement in the lottery seems to be declining while it is increasing in
the auction. The earlier mentioned incentives to miscoordinate in the auction, that are not
as prominent in the lottery, can explain the difference in these trends.
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Figure 8: Disagreement in allocations within groups. Left: lottery; Right: auction. Solid: n = 2;
Dashed: n = 3; Dotted: n = 4.
Result 3. For all group sizes, there is more agreement across allocations within groups in
the lottery than in the auction. For the lottery, agreement is decreasing in group size (not
significant for marginal changes). For the auction, agreement is decreasing in group size as
well.
Support. We test for treatment differences using two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests taking
for each group the average disagreement index over all rounds as unit of observation. The
p-values of the tests comparing the lottery and the auction are .001, .002 and .000 for n = 2,
n = 3 and n = 4, respectively. For the lottery, the p-value of the test comparing n = 2 with
n = 3 equals .439, the one comparing n = 3 with n = 4 equals .095, and the one comparing
13These axioms are part of the system to characterize indices for multi-dimensional inequality measurement
(Tsui, 1999) and measuring cohesiveness of preferences (Alcalde-Unzu & Vorsatz, 2013). Other axioms that
are used in these respective literatures seem less suitable to adopt in the present situation.
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n = 2 with n = 4 equals .004. For the auction, the p-values of the respective comparisons
equals .000, .219, and .000. At the 95% confidence level, the only change when basing the
analysis on observations in the last ten rounds is in the between n = 3 and n = 4 in the
auction of which the p-value drops to .049. 
The individuals in our experimental population clearly realized the strong incentives to mis-
align allocations in the auction, and these incentives seem to be stronger when the number of
participating players increases. This increases the level of strategic uncertainty in the auction
relative to the lottery. We believe it is precisely this strategic uncertainty that causes the
lower forecasting performance.
4.4 Environmental versus strategic uncertainty and common knowledge
In this final subsection we first try to gain understanding of the motives behind individual
allocations, by considering their beliefs and contrasting these with their allocations. Next,
we assess in how far individuals are able to form a common belief on the true realization
probabilities.
Figure 9 presents the average fraction of resources allocated to the different bins in the last
round (solid) and the average belief for the realization probabilities of each bin as revealed
after the last round (dashed) for the treatments where n = 3, taking into account the first
ten bins only. The left graph shows these for the lottery; the right one for the auction. The
gray-shaded area presents the true distribution (conditional on the first ten bins). From these
graphs it appears that allocations and beliefs are less aligned in the auction relative to the
lottery.14
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Figure 9: Average beliefs (dashed) and allocations (solid) in the last round, compared against the true
distribution (grey scale); all conditioned on first ten bins. Left: lottery; Right: auction.
14A similar effect is present in the graphs for the treatments with n = 2 and n = 4; see Figure 12 in the
supplementary material.
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Table 3 presents for each treatment (1) the average Hellinger distance between individ-
ual beliefs and the true realization probabilities, (2) the average Hellinger distance between
individual beliefs and allocations, and (3) the average disagreement across individual beliefs
within groups.
group size
2 3 4
mechanism H(βi, p) H(βi, σi) DA(β) H(βi, p) H(βi, σi) DA(β) H(βi, p) H(βi, σi) DA(β)
lottery 0.3248 0.2323 0.1326 0.2916 0.2012 0.1582 0.3300 0.2367 0.1944
auction 0.3903 0.3200 0.2128 0.5035 0.4049 0.2229 0.5188 0.4597 0.2231
Table 3: Quality of individual beliefs (H(βi, p)), agreement between individual beliefs and allocations
(H(βi, σi)), and agreement of beliefs within groups (DA(β)).
In the lottery, individuals form better beliefs in groups of size three than in groups of
size two or four – only the comparison between groups of size three and four is significant
(the relevant p-values are .104, .023 and .781). In the auction, individuals’ beliefs are worse
the larger the group size – only the comparison between groups of sizes three and four not
being significant (the relevant p-values are .000, .651 and .001). Moreover, individuals form
significantly better beliefs on what the true realization probabilities are in the lottery than in
the auction for all group sizes (the relevant p-values are .014, .000 and .000). From all these
findings it seems that an increase in strategic uncertainty comes at the expense of learning
about the uncertainty that is coming from the environment.15
In the lottery, individuals’ allocations of resources in the last round of play are closer to
their beliefs in groups of size three than in groups of size two or four – though not significant in
any comparison (the relevant p-values are .171, .310 and .980). Although insignificant in effect,
this inverse-u-shaped relation seems sufficient to amplify the similar inverse-u-shaped relation
on the belief formation, to generate the inverse-u-shaped relation in forecasting performance
in Result 1. In the auction, individual allocations are less similar to individual beliefs the
larger the group size – though not significant for the marginal comparisons (the relevant p-
values are .072, .219 and .017). While beliefs became worse in group size, allocations seem to
counterbalance this effect, in order to destroy any possible impact of group size on forecasting
performance (Result 1). Finally, and as expected, individual allocations of resources in the
last round of play are significantly closer to the individuals’ beliefs in the lottery than in the
auction (the relevant p-values are .020, .000 and .001). We belief the main reason of this is
15In Table 5 of the supplementary material we present the Hellinger distance between individual beliefs and
the distribution based on the realizations up to and including period 19, the period preceding the period that
we elicited the individual beliefs. In the lottery the stated beliefs are substantially closer to the true beliefs
that to the realizations. For the auction we find a similar property for groups of size two; for larger groups
we find that the beliefs are negligibly closer to the realizations than to the true beliefs. This seems to exclude
that beliefs are biased by the realized termination times – possibly indicating that all gradual innovations are
considered informative as well by the participants.
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not the difference in the belief formation process, but the incentive to misalign allocations
(Result 3).
Both in the lottery and the auction, there is less agreement across beliefs within groups
for larger groups sizes, but none of the marginal effects is significant (the relevant p-values
are .662, .129 and .007 for the lottery and .692, .917 and .743 for the auction). Furthermore,
there is more agreement across beliefs within groups in the lottery than in the auction for all
group sizes – only the comparison for group size of four not being significant (the relevant
p-values are .022, .024 and .863).
Result 4. For all group sizes, there is more agreement across beliefs within groups in the
lottery than in the auction. Both in the lottery and the auction, commonality in belief is not
highly dependent on group size.
So, the common belief assumption that what made in Section 2 finds less support in the
auction relative to the auction. There being a difference is striking since all individuals in all
treatments experienced the same realized time series in all rounds. Apparently, competitive-
ness of the payment rule has an impact on the learning process.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we develop and experimentally test a strategic mechanism to generate forecasts
of an uncertain event. We consider two different payment rules, an auction and a lottery.
In the lottery mechanism there is a unique equilibrium to reveal ones beliefs while this is
not the case under the auction payoff rule. To test the two payment rules we design an
experiment where subjects are asked to forecast the termination time of a timeseries. Unique
to our design is that subjects observe how this series develops dynamically over time and the
subjects thereby form beliefs about the underlying process without any precise quantitative
information. Our experimental results show that over time individuals in the lottery treatment
are able to forecast the underlying distribution with a significantly higher precision than in
the auction.
The findings presented here are in line with a growing literature on non-market based
elicitation mechanisms. Indeed, our results show that even with less than five forecasters we
are able to construct good distributional forecasts. Under the lottery payment rule we further
observe that three forecasters appear better than both two and four. Not having to rely on
many forecasters is essential when thinking about implementing forecasting mechanisms in
corporate settings where information may be highly sensitive and sharing of such information
unwanted.
Taken together, our results have important implications for the design of non-market
based forecasting mechanisms. First, we show that the payment rule significantly affects the
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equilibrium strategy of the game and also the observed behavior in the experiment. Second,
we show that this is largely an artifact of the increased strategic uncertainty of the game when
played with the auction rule. Under this rule, subjects are trying to outdo their opponents
by constantly changing their allocations across rounds so as to have the upper hand in the
game. This is evident when both looking at the individual changes across rounds and also
when looking at the within group disagreement.
Consequently, setting up competitive environments to elicit forecasts where the payment
rule allocates the entire payoff to the realized winner does not necessarily induce truthful
revelations of beliefs and will therefore lead to lower quality forecasts. Our paper suggests
that a lottery-type payment rule offers better distributional forecasts and should be preferred
over tournament like payment rules.
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